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THE NATIONAL POLICE POWER
UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION*
IV. REGULATIONS DENYING THE PRIVILEGES OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE TO HARMLESS GOODS PRODUCED UNDER
OBJECTIONABLE CONDITIONS-THE FEDERAL
CILD LABOR LAW
IN PASSING the Keating-Owen Child Labor Law- Congress
plunged, probably with some misgivings, into what was expected
to prove a new field of national police regulation. The act for-
bade the shipment in interstate commerce of the products of
mines and factories in which, within thirty days prior to their
shipment in such commerce, child labor had been employed. It
was an entirely novel exercise of the power to regulate com-
merce. Even those who deny that the unique character of the
act created any serious constitutional difficulty readily agree that
it stands in a class by itself as an exercise of congressional
authority. Hitherto Congress had exercised a national police
power under the commerce clause in two general ways: first, to
protect interstate commerce from injury and obstruction; second,
by refusing to allow it to be used to further the distribution of
obnoxious commodities or the consummation of injurious de-
signs. Wherever Congress had resorted to prohibitions of inter-
state commerce the prohibition had been justified upon the harm-
ful nature of the thing excluded; harmful either to commerce
itself or harmful in the use to which it was put. The goods
excluded by the Child Labor Law, however, were themselves
entirely harmless and legitimate in character, and harmless and
legitimate also in the use to which they were to be put; their
harmfulness consisted in the fact that they were produced under
conditions injurious to the public welfare. Like an illegitimate
child, they were made to bear the taint of the evil which brought
them into existence; the disability which attached to them was
created not because Congress in any way objected to having
that kind of goods distributed through interstate commerce but
*Continued from 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 412.
' Act of September 1, 1916, 39 Stat. at L. 675, Chap. 432.
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because it wished to make it unprofitable to employ children in
the manufacture of any kind of goods. The doctrine of the
Child Labor Law would have extended enormously the scope
of the national police power unde" the commerce clause by
placing within congressional regulation the conditions under
which any articles of interstate commerce are produced.
The history of the movement for a federal child labor law
shows that movement to have been in the main a trial and error
search for constitutionality. The most dangerous opposition to
such a law did not come from the friends of child-labor, a
group which grows constantly smaller and more silent; nor did
it come from the "states rights" advocates, who, on grounds of
policy and expediency, objected to the placing of child labor
under uniform national control-for few intelligent persons are
now prepared to deny that there is small hope for an effective
suppression of the child labor curse in the divergent legislation
of forty-eight states. On the contrary, the opposition which
counted most came from those who, while sympathising with
the objects of the law, honestly doubted that there was any sound
constitutional basis upon which a child labor law under the com-
merce clause could rest; who, in the apt phrase of one of their
number, could not convince themselves "that 'accroachment of
power' is expedient when benevolent, and that, though a child is
entitled to protection, the constitution is not."12 This was ap-
parent from the very outset. The first federal child labor bill
was introduced into the Senate in 1906 by Senator Albert J.
Beveridge of Indiana. This pioneer bill forbade any interstate
carrier to transport the products of any mine or factory in which
children under fourteen years of age were employed; and to
make the bill effective the management of any establishment
desiring to ship goods in interstate commerce was compelled to
give the common carrier a statement that no such children were
employed in its plant. ' In a brilliant speech extending over three
2 Green. The Child Labor Law and the Constituticn, Ill. Law Bul.,
April. 1917, p. 6.
3 The portions of this bill which are of inttrest in this connection are
as follows: "Be it enacted . . . That six months from and after the
passage of this act no carrier of interstate commerce shall transport or
accept for transportation the products of any factory or mine in which
children under fourteen years of age are employed or permitted to work,
which products are offered to said interstate carrier by the firm, 1)erson,
or corporation owning or operating said factory or mine, or any officer or
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days Senator Beveridge set forth the need for such legislation
and defended its constitutionality.-- The most distinguished legal
talent in the Senate was drawn into this debate; and it was plain
to see that with but few exceptions their views of its validity
Tanged from skepticism to the clear conviction that it was un-
constitutional.5 The bill never became law, and the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives to which it was
referred made a report setting forth its belief that the bill was
clearly invalid.6 With the retirement of MVr. Beveridge from the
Senate, the active efforts of congressmen to secure federal legis-
lation upon the problem of child labor for the time being ceased.
The Keating-Owen bill was the successor to the Beveridge
bill. As introduced into the House, it forbade the shipment in
interstate commerce of goods produced in whole or in part by
the labor of children under fourteen years of age. This bill was
not wholly satisfactory to the National Child Labor Committee
which was sponsoring it, because placing the prohibition
merely upon child-made goods narrowed considerably the scope
of the act; though there was a belief that a stronger argument
could be made for its constitutionality than for one broader in
agent or servant thereof, for transportaton into any other state or territory
than the one in which said factory is located.
"Sec. 2. That no carrier of interstate commerce shall transport or
accept for transportation the products of any factory 'or mine offered it for
transportation by any person, firm, or corporation which owns or operates
such factory or mine, or any officer, agent, or servant of such person. firm,
or corporation, until the president or secretary or general manager of such
corporation or a member of such firm or the-person owning or operating
such factory or mine shall file with said carrier an affidavit to the effect
that children under fourteen years of age are not employed in such fac-
tory or mine." The full text of this bill may be conveniently found at
page 56 of the supplement to vol. XXIX, Annals of the American Acad-
emy, etc., (1907).
4 Cong. Rec. vol. 41, pp. 1552-1557, 1792-1826, 1867-1883.
It was probably doubt as to the constitutionality of the Beveridge bill
which led Senator Lodge to introduce a rival bill (S. 6730) on December
5, 1906, which provided: "That the introduction into any state or territory
or the District of Columbia, or shipment to any foreign country, of any
article in the manufacture 'or production of which a minor under the age
of fourteen years has been engaged is hereby prohibited." The second
section applied a similar prohibition to goods made by children between
fourteen and sixteen years, except those made by "any minor between the
ages of fourteen and sixteen years to whom has been granted a certificate"
by various school authorities "testifying to the fact that he or she is able
to read and write the English language." This bill was referred to the
Committee on Education and Labor, but it seems never to have attracted
much notice or discussion.
6 House Rell. No. 7304, 59th Cong.. Second Session. Part of the argu-
ment of this committee is quoted in Watson, Constitution, I, pp. 532-534.
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scope. When the bill came before the Committee on Interstate
Commerce in the Senate it was changed into the form in which
it was finally enacted, a form which made it a far more effective
law.- In this form it forbade not merely child-made goods but
the products of any mine or factory in which children were em-
ployed. The President signed the bill September 1, 1916, and
by its terms it became effective September 1, 1917. Almost im-
mediately a bill was filed in a federal district court in North
Carolina by a father on behalf of himself and his two minor sons
asking for an injunction against the enforcement of the act. The
district court held the act unconstitutional," and an appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. On June 3,
1918, the Supreme Court handed down a five to four decision
invalidating the law."
Few questions have arisen in recent years in our constitutional
law upon which the professional opinion of the" country has been
more evenly divided. Few questions have called forth on both
sides abler or more convincing arguments. Discussion of the
question had been kept up intermittently during the dozen years
between the introduction of the Beveridge bill and the decision
of the Supreme Court upon the constitutionality of the Keating-
Owen Act; and that decision, rendered as it was by an almost
evenly divided court with a vigorous dissenting minority, called
7An account of the legislative history.of the bill is found in Pamphlet
No. 265 of the National Child Labor Committee (1916).
The relevant portion of this act is as follows: "Be it enacted ....That no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for ship-
ment in interstate or foreign commerce any article or commodity theproduct of any mine or quarry, situated in the United States, in which
within thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such product there-from children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or per-
mitted to work, or any article or commodity the product of any mill,
cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, situated inthe United States, in which within thirty days prior to the removal of suchproduct therefrom children under the age of fourteen years have been
employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteenyears and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work more
than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or afterthe hour of seven o'clock postmeridian, or before the hour of six o'clock
antemeridian."
8 No opinion was written. This decision was rendered by the samejudge who, according to press reports, has recently declared unconstitu-
tional the clause of the Revenue Act of Feb. 24, 1919, placing a ten per
cent excise tax upon the net profits of businesses employing children.
9 Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 38 S. C.
R. 529.
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forth a new grist of opinion.10 Even now the layman who ap-
proaches the problem without definite preconceptions is greatly
in danger of experiencing a painful instability of opinion and ol
finding himself landed finally on the side of the advocate or critic
to whose arguments he last gave ear.
There would be small justification for the writer to add to the
already voluminous literature on the subject another argument
for or against the validity of the federal Child Labor Law. How-
ever, a discussion of the national police power under the com-
merce clause would hardly be complete without some attempt to
classify the precise constitutional issues involved in this attempt
to extend that power so radically. An effort will be made,
therefore, to set forth as plainly and fairly as possible the argu-
ments which have been advanced, first by those who have believed
the act to be unconstitutional and second by those who have
regarded it as valid. In each case the reasoning of the majority
and minority, respectively, of the Supreme Court will be briefly
summarized as fitting conclusions to the briefs.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW
Inasmuch as the constitutionality of a law is to be presumed
until disproved, it will be appropriate to present first the argu-
ments of those who have attacked the validity of the law." These
arguments quite naturally differ a great deal in persuasiveness,
in thoroughness of reasoning, and in the emphasis placed upon
the different points considered. In spite of this diversity it is
possible to melt them all together into a brief composed of three
major arguments, which will be considered separately. The
writer has made no special effort at originality in setting forth
10While there are differences between the provisions of the Beveridge
bill and the Keating-Owen Act, these differences are largely in the method
used to accomplish the legislative purpose and not differences in consti-
tutional principle. The fundamental issue of constitutionality seems to be
the same in both, and the arguments for and against the measures are
applicable to both alike.
11 In addition to the arguments presented in the debate in Congress
above referred to (see note 4, supra), the Beveridge bill was criticized
on constitutional grounds by the following writers: Bruce, The Beveridge
Child Labor Bill and the United States as Parens Patriae, (1907) 5 Mich.
Law Rev. 627; Maxey, The Constitutionality of the Beveridge Child Labor
Bill, (1907) 19 Green Bag 290; Knox, Development of the Federal Power
to Regulate Commerce, (1908) 17 Yale Law Jour. 135: Willoughby, Con-
stitution, II, Sec. 348; Watson, Constitution, I, pp. 523-534. Before the
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these arguments, but has attempted to present a sort of com-
posite picture made up of all of them, a picture in which, as in
the real composite photograph, the details of each component are
lost to view, but in which the common characteristics stand out
vividly.
1. It Is Not a Regulation of Commerce. It is important to
bear in mind that Congress has no power to deal openly and
directly with the evil of child labor. It merely has the right to
regulate interstate commerce. Therefore, while the federal
Child Labor Law was admittedly passed for the purpose of driv-
ing child labor out of existence, it was compelled, from the
standpoint of constitutional law, to seek justification not as a
child labor law but as a regulation of interstate commerce. If
it can be shown that the law is not a regulation of interstate com-
merce, then its constitutional underpinning collapses and it must
be regarded as an attempt by Congress to exercise a power which
it does not possess under the constitution. Probably without ex-
ception the opponents of the law have built their case around this
central and vital point, that it is not a regulation of commerce.
The arguments advanced in support of this proposition may be
set forth as follows:
(a) Not Every Regulation Dealing with Commerce Is a
Regulation of Commerce in the Constitutional Sense: The fact
that the Child Labor Law is entitled "An Act to Prevent Inter-
state Commerce in the Products of Child Labor, and for Other
Purposes," coupled with the fact that the thing which the law
punishes is not the employment of children, but the shipment
in interstate commerce of certain commodities, raises an initial
presumption that it is a regulation of commerce. Constitutional
Keating-Owen Act was declared invalid, its constitutionality was attacked
in the following articles: Green, The Child Labor Law and the Constitu-
tion, Ill. Law Bul.. April, 1917; Gleick, The Constitutionality of the Child
Labor Law. (1918) 24 Case and Com. 801; Hull, The Federal Child Labor
Law. (1916) 31 Pol. Sci. Quar. 519; Krum, Child Labor, (1917) 24 Case
and Com. 486. See also the general criticism in Hough, Covert Legisla-
tion and the Constitution, (1917) 30 Harv. Law Rev. 801. The decision of
the Supreme Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra. note 9. was discussed
with approval in the following articles: Berry, The Police Power of Con-
gress under Authority to Regulate Commerce. (1918) 87 Cent. Law Jour.
314; Bruce, Interstate Commerce and Child Labor, (1919) 3 MINNEsoTA
LAW REvIEW 89: Green. Social Justice and Interstate Commerce. (1918)
208 North Amer. Rev. 387; and note, (1919) 2 Ili. Law Bul. 126; Taft.
The Power of Congress to Override the States, (July. 1918) 15 Open Shop
Rev. 273. See also editorial (1918) in 86 Cent. Law Jour. 441.
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phrases must not, however, be construed "with childish literal-
ness." It must not be naively assumed that everything which
is labeled a regulation of commerce or which in some way affects
commerce is a regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense.
The extent and nature of the power of Congress over interstate
commerce must be interpreted in the light of the purposes for
which the power was granted.'2  For instance, the governments
of the state and nation enjoy a power of taxation which in "the
extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited;""1 yet when
the state of Kansas authorized a city to levy a tax for a private
and not a public purpose the Supreme Court of the United States
declared that the levy was not a tax, merely "because it is done
under the forms of law and is called taxation," but was "a decree
under legislative forms."' 4 In like manneP the Child Labor Law
is not necessarily a regulation of commerce simply because it is
done under the forms of law and is called "a regulation of com-
merce."
(b) Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce Was Given to
Promote and Not to Destroy Commerce: If we had no light
whatever upon the purposes for which the power to regulate
commerce was given to Congress by the framers of the consti-
tution, it would still be reasonable to argue that the power to
"regulate" does not include any general power to "destroy" or to
"prohibit" commerce. A grant of "the power to regulate neces-
sarily implies the existence of the thing to be regulated."' 5
Where power has been given to state legislatures or city councils
to "regulate" the liquor traffic the courts have held that no au-
thority was thereby given to "prohibit" such traffic.'" It is logical
to assume that the power to regulate commerce should be thoughi
of as "a power to regulate acts of commerce so as to promote the
good or prevent the evil that might flow from those acts."''
While it might properly include the power to make all necessary
rules to protect commerce and promote its efficiency and to pre-
12 This point is clearly developed by Professor Green, op. cit., Ill. Law
Bul., note 11, supra.
'
3 Loan Association v. Topeka, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 655; 22 L. Ed.
455.
14 Ibid.
15 Watson. Constitution. I. p. 532, citing State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17; State
v. McCann, 72 Tenn. [4 Lea] 1.
16 Watson, op. cit., p. 532.
17 Green, op. cit., Ill. Law Bul. 13.
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vent the injury to the national welfare which might flow from
the acts and transactions of commerce, it cannot be held to
include the authority to prohibit commerce in innocent and harm-
less commodities.
But we are not entirely in the dark as to the purposes for
which the "fathers" placed the power to regulate commerce in
the hands of Congress. While the debates in the Convention of
1787 do not throw much light on the subject, the whole history
of the Confederation as well as the contemporary literature of
the period would seem to indicate a hope and desire that Con-
gress would bring about freedom of commercial intercourse,
freedom which would replace the oppressive and mutually re-
taliatory obstructions which emanated from the jealousies of
the separate states. There was apparently no thought that
Congress was being given power by the new constitution to
prohibit commerce in legitimate articles because it disapproved
of the local conditions under which they were produced. While
the Convention of 1787 went out of its way to forbid in express
terms any congressional interference with the importation of
slaves prior to 1808,18 yet it made no effort to prevent Congress
from excluding from commerce the products of slave-labor,-
an exclusion clearly in line with the Child Labor Law-quite as
though it assumed that Congress had no such authority. Cer-
tainly it can hardly be believed that either the framers of the
constitution or the conventions which ratified it had any idea
that they had given to Congress any power under the commerce
clause to knife the institution of slavery in the back.
It has been forcefully argued that since, prior to the adoption
of the constitution, the several states enjoyed full and sovereign
power to prohibit commerce with the other states, as any inde-
pendent nation might prohibit it, and that since the states gave
up their power to Congress and made that power of Congress
plenary and exclusive, it must therefore follow that Congress
received all the power that the states gave up.19 Otherwise what
became of it? The answer is that it went back into the hands
of the people, the same "people" who hold all the other powers
Qf government "not delegated to the United States by the Con-




stitution" nor "reserved to the States respectively." 20 Indeed,
it is quite within reason to suppose that the framers of the con-
stitution consciously intended to wipe out of existence entirely
any power to prohibit interstate commerce in legitimate com-
modities by withdrawing that power from the individual states
which had abused it and by failing to confer it upon Congress
which might abuse it.
(c) In Its Real Purpose and Effect the Law Has Nothing to
Do with Interstate Commerce: The contention that the Child
Labor Law is not a regulation of interstate commerce in the
constitutional sense has been most frequently and cogently
grounded upon the fact that the purpose and effect of the act
is to prohibit child labor, something quite remote from the act
of shipping commodities in interstate commerce. "Its purpose
and effect are to benefit children and not to benefit commerce. "21
Thus the statute is looked upon as somehow fraudulent, or mis-
branded. This argument is presented in several ways.
It has been urged by some that the Child Labor Law is in
effect a denial by Congress of the privileges of interstate com-
merce as a penalty for doing things of which Congress does not
approve but which it has no power to prohibit directly. This has
been aptly expressed in this way: "Plainly the reason for the
statute must be stated in the first instance in this form: 'The
state does not like what you are doing. Therefore it has for-
bidden you to do something else-ship certain goods-not be-
cause that is in the least degree objectionable, but because the
state thinks it can in this way make you so uncomfortable
that you will quit employing children. '22 In commenting on the
case in which the Supreme Court held the law invalid, ex-
President Taft said: "The majority of the court decided that this
was an attempt by Congress to regulate the use of child labor
in the state. Will any man say that this was not its purpose?
It was a congressional threat to the state, 'Unless you make your
labor laws to suit us we shall prevent your use of interstate
commerce for the sale of your goods.' "23 In short, when Congress
uses its power over commerce as a "club for belaboring persons
20 Constitution of the United States, Amendment X.
21 Green, op. cit., Ill. Law Bul., note 11, supra.
22 Ibid.
23 Taft, op. cit., note 11, supra.
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whose habits it does not approve, '24 its action ought in reason to
be regarded as a regulation not of the club but of the thing or
person clubbed.
Others have laid emphasis in this connection on the fact that
the statute is in effect a regulation of manufacturing or produc-
tion. It is then pointed out that manufacturing is antecedent to
and wholly separate from commerce and transportation and that
the authority of Congress extends only to the latter..2 5
It is further suggested that the purpose and effect of the act
is to regulate the relations between employers and employees
who are not themselves engaged in the processes of interstate
commerce, and to regulate them in respect to a matter that in
no way concerns interstate commerce,-namely, the age of the
employee. In the Adair case 26 Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out
that a regulation of the relations between master and servant in
respect to the membership of employees in a labor union did not
bear sufficiently close connection to interstate commerce to be
regarded as a legitimate regulation of that commerce. The
regulation imposed upon employers by the Child Labor Law is
thought to be still less closely related to interstate commerce.
It is quite natural that those who attack the Child Labor Law
on the ground that it is too remote from interstate commerce
to be a legitimate regulation of it should be challenged to show
that the law is less a regulation of commerce than the Lottery
Act, the Pure Food Act, the White Slave Act, and the other
statutes by which Congress has prohibited commerce in various
commodities. The friends of the law claim that the only possible
distinction between the Child Labor Law and these other acts.
the validity of which is no longer open to question is that in the
one case Congress uses its power over interstate commerce to.
protect the producer and in the other case to protect the con-
sumer. This distinction, it is urged, is wholly irrelevant and'
immaterial so far as any question of the constitutional limits of
24 Green, op. cit., North Amer. Rev., note 11, supra.
25 The cases usually relied on to support this view are United States
v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 325, 15 S. C. R. 249;
Kidd v. Pearson, (1888) 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. Ed. 346, 9 S. C. R. 6; In re
Greene, (1892) 52 Fed. 104.
26 Adair v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 436, 29
S. C. R. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764. Professor Goodnow severely criticizes
the use of the Adair case as an authority to prove the Child Labor Law-
not a regulation of commerce. See Social Reform and the Constitution,
87.
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congressional power over commerce is concerned, since there is
nothing in the constitution nor in the decisions of the Supreme
Court to indicate that the consumer is any more entitled to pro-
tection through any exercise of the commerce power than is the
producer.2 7
It seems clear that this distinction between regulations which
guard the interests of the consumer and those which seek to
improve the condition of the producer has been given a promi-
nence by writers on both sides of this controversy which has
tended to obscure what the opponents of the law regard as the
vital distinction between it and the police regulations which
Congress has previously enacted under the commerce clause. This
distinction is that in the Lottery and Vhite Slave Acts Congress
has used its power over interstate commerce to prevent evils
which might be said to result in the sense of actual causation from
the acts or processes of interstate commerce. "In all of these
cases, the introduction of the thing carried into the state is an
act of evil tendency. Introducing it contributes to produce evil;
it is a part of a course of action by which evil is consummated.1
2s
These acts are all "regulations of commerce made with a view
to the results that may flow from the commerce regulated; to
prevent evils that, unregulated, it might produce, or to promote
benefits that, unregulated, it might not produce. '29 But the Child
Labor Law does not prevent any evil which can be said to result
from the acts or transaction of interstate commerce. The curse
of child labor cannot be said to be promoted by the freedom of
the employer of children to ship his products in interstate com-
merce simply because he might cease to employ children if that
freedom were denied to him, any more than it can be said that
child labor is promoted by free education because those who now
employ children might cease to do so if, because of that, they
were denied the right to send their children to the public schools.
It cannot be said, therefore, that when Congress passed the Child
Labor Law it was preventing the use of interstate commerce as
a means of promoting a national evil, since the evil in question
is not in any reasonable sense promoted by the uninterrupted
flow of interstate commerce. This fact makes clear the distinc-
27 Infra, p. 475.
28 Green, op. cit., North Amer. Rev., note 11, supra.
29 Ibid.
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tion between this act and the other instances in which Congress
has exercised police power under the commerce clause.
It would seem that those who regard the Child Labor Law
as just as real and thoroughgoing a regulation of commerce as
the Lottery Act or the White Slave Act have trod, perhaps un-
consciously, the following steps: (1) By passing these regula-
tions of commerce, the Lottery Act and so forth, Congress has
openly intended to protect the public morals, health, and safety,
and has exercised a police power. (2) Therefore Congress en-joys a broad police power in the exercise of which it may set up
any type of control over interstate commerce which will result
in benefit to the public morals, health, and safety. (3) The
exclusion of the output of child labor factories from interstate
commerce will result in great good to the nation by safeguarding
its children. (4) Therefore the Child Labor Law is a proper
exercise of this police power of Congress under the commerce
clause and should be regarded with no more suspicion or disfavor
than the White Slave Act or the Lottery Act, which have also
protected the national health, morals, and general welfare. Now
the opponents of the Child Labor Law believe that there is a non
sequitur between (1) and (2). It does not follow from the
authority of the Lottery Case30 and the Hoke" - case that Con-
gress has a police power unlimited in scope and limited only in
the means available for its exercise. Congress has police power,
but only such as can be exercised within the limits of the domain
under congressional control-interstate commerce. This police
power extends to the suppression of any evil which threatens
interstate commerce or arises from or is being consummated by
that commerce. Now the evil of child labor does not exist with-
in the domain of interstate commerce; it exists where the chil-
dren are employed. "The menace in the case of child labor is
over and done with when the product is manufactured. .
The exercise of the police power in prohibiting the use of inter-
state transportation for such products will operate of course as
a deterrent. But it seems clear that thereby the police power
becomes operative outside of the domain of interstate commerce.
And beyond the borders of that domain the police power of
30 (1903) 188 U. S. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492, 23 S. C. R. 321.
31 (1913) 227 U. S. 308, 57 L. Ed. 523, 33 S. C. R. 281.
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Congress, like the king's writ beyond his kingdom, does not
r u n . , ,a3 
2
This is not a matter of inquiring into congressional motives
and invalidating a law because those motives were disingenuous.
It is purely a question of power. The act fails as a regulation
of commerce not because its purpose and effect are to prohibit
child labor but because the child labor prohibited has nothing to
do with interstate commerce. If interstate railroads employed
children, Congress could doubtless forbid the employment of chil-
dren in interstate commerce, just as it has prevented cruelty to
animals while they are being transported by an interstate car-
rier.a Such a law would deal with an evil which existed within
the domain of interstate commerce and not an evil which is over
and done with before the commerce the power to regulate which
forms the basis of congressional action begins.
The opponents of the Child Labor Law argue further that
the extensive and arbitrary power which Congress has used to
prohibit foreign commerce in various commodities constitutes
no authority for the exercise of a similar power over interstate
commerce. The power of Congress over foreign commerce is
more extensive than over interstate commerce. Several reasons
support this view. In the first place, the commerce clause is not
the exclusive source of the power which Congress enjoys over
foreign commerce. The power over foreign commerce derived
from the commerce clause is supplemented by the power derived
from the sovereign authority of the federal government to regu-
late its relations with other countries a4 In the second place,
assuming that the word "regulate" used in the commerce clause
means the same and bestows the same power upon Congress in
regard to both interstate and foreign commerce, nevertheless
there are certain constitutional limitations which operate as re-
strictions upon congressional power over interstate commerce
which do not apply to foreign commerce in the same way. The
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in the Lottery Case"
suggests that the power of Congress over interstate commerce is
subject to a limitation growing out of the "implied or reserved
power in the states" which would not apply to the regulation of
32 Hull, op. cit., 524. note 11, supra.
3 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. at L. 833.
3 Willoughby, Constitution, Secs. 64, 66, 374, with cases cited.
35 Note 30, supra.
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interstate commerce. This amounts to invoking indirectly the
Tenth Amendment as a restriction on the power over interstate
commerce. It has been intimated elsewhere by the court as well
as by other authorities that while the complete prohibitions of
foreign commerce would not deprive any one of property with-
out due process of law, since no individual has a right to trade
with foreign nations,36 a similar prohibition of interstate com-
merce might under many circumstances amount to a denial of
due process of law by invading the constitutional right of the
citizen to engage in such commerce. In the third place, in spite
of numerous dicta in early opinions to the effect that the scope
of congressional authority over the two kinds of commerce is
identical, there is not a single case, out of all that have afforded
an opportunity for such a decision, in which the Supreme Court
has decided squarely that it is.3 7
In similar manner it is pointed out that the police power
which Congress has exercised through its control over the postal
system, a power which has been used to exclude from the mails
a wide variety of things, does not constitute any authority for
the power used to pass the Child Labor Law. In the first place,
it is impossible to mention any act by which Congress has actually
excluded any commodity from the mails because of the objec-
tionable character of the conditions under which it was produced;
and in the second place, the power of Congress over the postal
system is broader than over interstate commerce, inasmuch as
Congress has explicit authority to "establish post offices and post
roads,""8 while in respect to interstate commerce the power given
is not to "establish" but to "regulate." It may very properly be
argued that no one is deprived of any property right without due
process of law by being denied the enjoyment even somewhat
arbitrarily of privileges and facilities which Congress may not
36 "As a result of the complete power of Congress over foreign
commerce, it necessarily follows that no individual has a vested right
to trade with foreign nations which is so broad in character as to limit
and restrict 'the power of Congress to determine what articles of mer-
chandise may be imported into this country and 'the terms upon which a
right to import may be exercised. This being true, it results that a
statute which restrains the introduction of particular goods into the
United States from considerations of public policy does not violate the
due process clause of the Constitution." Buttfield v. Stranahan, (1904)
192 U. S. 470, 48 L. Ed. 525, 24 S. C. R. 349.
37 Senator Knox made this statement during the course of the debate
in the Senate on the Beveridge bill. Cong. Rec. vol. 41, p. 1879.
38 Constitution of the United States, Art. I, Sec. 8.
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merely create but may also destroy; whereas he may claim a
higher degree of protection for his right to engage in an inter-
state commerce which was not in the power of Congress to create
but merely to "regulate."
The foregoing analysis presents what the writer regards as
the more important arguments which have been used to prove
that the Child Labor Law is not a regulation of commerce in the
constitutional sense. A somewhat extended discussion of the
point has seemed desirable, because it is without question the point
which has been most hotly debated and which has seemed to the
authorities on both sides of the case the most vital issue involved
in the whole controversy.
2. It Violates the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amend-
ment reserves to the states or to the people all powers not dele-
gated to the federal government nor prohibited to the states. It
has been alleged that the federal Child Labor Law contravenes
this amendment.
Now if the opponents of the law succeed in establishing their
contention that the act is not a regulation of commerce, then it
would seem to follow as a matter of course that Congress has
passed a law which cannot be justified as an exercise of any
delegated power, and such a law becomes ipso facto an invasion
of the reserved rights of the states. The argument has not
always been put, however, in this conservative form. More than
one critic of the law has urged as a more or less separate objec-
tion to it that in its purpose and effect it invades the reserved
rights of the states and therefore violates the spirit if not the
letter of the Tenth Amendment. "It was conceded by all," de-
clared ex-President Taft. "that only States could regulate child
labor. . . . Can any man fairly say that this was not an
effort of Congress. by duress, to control the discretion of the
9 This distinction is emphasized with clearness by Bruce, op. cit., 3
MINFSOTA LAW REVIEW 96. and also by Willoughby, op. cit., Sec. 349.
Both writers rely upon the statement of the court in Ex parte Tackson,
(1877) 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877: "We do not think that Congress
possesses the power to prevent the transportation in other ways, as
merchandise, of matter which it excludes from the mails. To give efficiency
to its regulations and to prevent rival postal systems, it may perhaps
prohibit the carriage by others for hire, over postal routes, of articles
which legitimately constitute mail matter, in the sense in which those
terms were used when the Constitution was adopted, consisting of letters,
and of newspapers and pamphlets when not sent as merchandise; but
further than this its power of prohibition cannot extend."
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State intended by the Constitution to be free? ' 40  Professor
Willoughby regards it as "an attempt upon the part of the Federal
Government to regulate a matter reserved to the control of the
States."' The same view is most emphatically expressed by the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in reporting
upon the Beveridge bill. They said: "The lives, health, and
property of the women and children engaged in labor are exclu-
sively within the power of the States, originally and always be-
longing to the States, not surrendered by them to Congress.
The assertion of such power by Congress would destroy
every vestige of State authority, obliterate State lines, nullify the
great work of the framers of the Constitution, and leave the State
governments mere matters of form, devoid of power, and ought
to more than satisfy the fondest dreams of those favoring cen-
tralization of power."
4 2
Vhile courts have usually refrained from invalidating laws
because of their alleged violation of the "spirit" of the constitu-
tional prohibitions in cases where some doubt has existed as to
the violation of the letter, attention is called to the fact that one
of the important restrictions upon the power of the states and of
the federal government to levy taxes has been grounded, not upon
any specific clause of the constitution, but upon the essential
nature of the federal union. This is the restriction upon the lay-
ing by either government of taxes upon the agencies, property,
functions, or instrumentalities of the other.43  While this re-
striction has not rested upon any alleged violation of the Tenth
Amendment, it has been argued that it would not be unreasonable
for the Supreme Court to use it as authority by way of analogy
for recognizing the existence of certain restrictions upon the
exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce when by
40 Taft, op. cit., p. 273, note 11, supra.
41 Willoughby. op. cit.. II, Sec. 348
42 Quoted by Watson, op. cit., pp. 532-534.
43 Willoughby, op. cit., 1, Sec. 40. In The Collector v. Day, (1870)
11 Wall. (U.S.) 113, 20 L. Ed. 122. the court said: "It is admitted that
there is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibits the
general government from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the
states, nor is there any prohibiting the states from taxing the means and
instrumentalities of that government. In both cases the exemption rests
upon necessary implication, and is upheld by the great law of self-pres-
ervation: as any government, whose means employed in conducting its
operations, if subject to the control of another and distinct government,
can exist only at the mercy of that government." See also Green, op.
cit., Ill. Law Bul. 13.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
such regulation the essential nature of the federal union in the
matter of the distribution of powers is being threatened.
3. It Takes Liberty and Property Without Due Process of
Law. Even if it be granted, however, that the Child Labor Law
is a regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense and that
it is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment, it has still been
the object of attack as an act which deprives persons of liberty
and property without due process of law. It has already been
made clear 44 that any exercise of a natidnal police power must
be kept within the limits of the specific restrictions of the Bill
of Rights, perhaps the most important of which is the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.45 The argument that the act
is a violation of the guarantee of due process of law has taken
two forms.
In the first place, it has been urged that "the right to liberty
and property would certainly include the continuance of the right
of interstate traffic in goods which were in themselves harmless
and innocent."4G No one can be said to enjoy a property right to
ship commodities in interstate commerce when those commodities
are harmful or when the shipment itself is an act of evil tendency.
But any prohibition placed by Congress upon the right to ship
harmless commodities destined for harmless uses constitutes an
arbitrary invasion of a property right and is a denial of due
process of law.
Now those who deny the validity of the Child Labor Law do
not agree among themselves that there is a property right to ship
goods in interstate commerce . 4  But even assuming that no such
right does exist, it is still urged that the law fails of due process.
It is well established that any state may prohibit child labor with-
out depriving any one of his constitutional rights; but it is equally
well established that Congress cannot directly'prohibit child labor
under any power it now possesses. Now it is argued that even if
the right to ship harmless goods in interstate commerce is one
which Congress tinder the commerce clause might legitimately
take away entirely, it would still be a denial of liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law for Congress to make the con-
tinued enjoyment of the privileges of interstate commerce con-
44 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 299.
45 Gonstitution of the United States, Amendment V.
46 Bruce, op. cit.. 5 Mich. Law Rev. 636.
47 See infra. p. 476.
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tingent upon abandoning a course of action which so far as any
possible prohibition by Congress is concerned a person has a per-
fect right to pursue. In other words, Congress cannot withdraw
a privilege which can be enjoyed only under its permission, for
the purpose of making that withdrawal a punishment for doing
something which Congress had no direct authority to forbid. Such
an exercise of power by Congress rests upon the same principle
as a state statute which, while not directly forbidding child labor,
forbids those who employ children "to shave, to ride in an auto-
mobile, or to have children of their own."4 s It is one thing to
prohibit child labor directly; it is another and far different
thing to permit the continuance of child labor only on the condi-
tion of the forfeiture of a right or privilege shared by all the
other members of the community. In Western Union Telegraph
Company v. Kansas" the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
company had been denied due process of law by a statute which
made its admission into the state as a foreign corporation-ad-
mission which it was granted the state was under no obligation
whatever to allow-contingent upon payment by the company of
taxes which the state was without constitutional authority to im-
pose. There are other cases in which a similar principle has been
applied.50 It is in the light of the authority of these cases and
the reasoning set forth above that the Child Labor Law is be-
lieved to work a denial of due process of law.
4. The Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court.51  It is
unnecessary to dwell at length upon the opinion of the majority
of the Supreme Court which held the federal Child Labor Law
invalid. That opinion was reasoned with a brevity that was
entirely surprising considering the importance of the question
involved. It does not allude in any way to the contention of the
plaintiff that the act works a denial of due process of law. The
decision rested upon two points: first, that the Child Labor Law is
48 Green, op. cit., Ill. Law Bul. 11. The most effective statement of
this argument is found in Professor Green's article.
40 (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355, 30 S. C. R. 190.
5 oHerndon v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., (1910) 218 U. S. 135, 54 L. Ed.
970. 30 S. C. R. 633; Harrison v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1914) 232 U. S.
318. 58 L. Ed. 621, 34 S. C. R. 333; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head,
(1914) 234 U. S. 149, 58 L. Ed. 332, 34 S. C. R. 879. These cases cited
by Green, op. cit., Ill. Law Bul. 18.
5' Written by Mr. Justice Day and concurred in by justices White,
VanDevanter, Pitney, and McReynolds.
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not a regulation of commerce, second, that it violates the Tenth
Amendment.
The first of these arguments proceeds along familiar lines.
The power to "regulate" commerce is the power to "prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed," and does not include
the right to "forbid commerce from moving and thus destroying
it as to particular commodities." The cases in which Congress has
prohibited interstate commerce in certain commodities have all
rested "upon the character of the particular subjects dealt with
and the fact that the scope of governmental authority, state or
national, possessed over them is such that the authority to pro-
hibit is as to them but the exertion of the power to regulate ...
In each of these instances the use of interstate transportation was
necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results." The Child
Labor Law does not, however, regulate transportation, but aims
to standardize child labor. The goods shipped are harmless and
the fact that they may be intended for interstate commerce does
not make them articles of that commerce at the time they were
produced. There is no force in the argument that the law pre-
vents unfair competition between states with child labor laws of
different standards. So also there are many conditions which give
certain states advantages over others, but Congress has no power
to regulate local trade and commerce for such a purpose.
The act violates the Tenth Amendment. "The grant of au-
thority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy
the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the
states in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution." Under the
law Congress "exerts a power as to purely local matters to which
the federal authority does not extend. The far reaching result of
upholding the act cannot be more plainly indicated than by point-
ing out that if Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to
local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in
interstate commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at an end,
and the power of the states over local matters may be elimi-
nated, and thus our system of government be practically de-
stroyed."
THE ARGUMENT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW
The constitutionality of the Child Labor Law has probably
been discussed more frequently and at greater length by its
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friends than by its enemies.5 2  An analysis of the arguments ir
support of the law indicates that they clash squarely at all vital
points with the arguments which have just been set forth. They
may, therefore, be grouped under the same three headings.
1. It Is a Regulation of Commerce in the Constitutional Sense.
The friends of the Child Labor Law have bent their efforts with
special care to proving that it is a regulation of commerce in the
constitutional sense, a task which has of course involved disprov-
ing the arguments of their opponents that the law is not such a
regulation. This task has been approached in a wide variety of
ways and from many different points of view. The writer believes,
however, that these arguments may all be subsumed under three
major propositions, which if established would prove the point at
issue. These will be treated in order.
(a) The Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce Includes
the Power to Prohibit Entirely Shipment in Such Commerce of
Specified Persons and Property: In the first place, the power to
prohibit is not incompatible with the power to regulate commerce.
Even if it is true that "the power to regulate implies the existence
of the thing regulated,"53 it is equally true that "the power to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is carried on does not
negative the power to prescribe that certain commerce shall not
be carried on."'54 As Mr. Justice Holmes puts it, "Regulation
52Before the Supreme Court annulled the law, the following dis-
cussions had appeared supporting its constitutionality: Goodnow. Social
Reform and the Constitution, (1911) 80; MacChesney. Constitutionality
of a Federal Child Labor Law, (1915) The Child Labor Bul. IV. p. 155;Parkinson, Brief for the Keating-Owen Bill. (1916) The Child LaborBul.. IV. pt. 2. p. 219; Constitutional Prohibitions of Interstate Com-
merce, (1916) 16 Col. Law Rev. 367; The Federal Child Labor Law,(1916) 31 Pol. Sci. Quar. 531; Precedents for Federal Child Labor
Legislation, (1915) The Child Labor Bul., IV, p. 72; Troutman, Con-
stitutionality of a Federal Child Labor Law. (1914) 26 Green Bag 154; see
also note, The Use of the Power over Interstate Commerce for Police
Purposes, (1917) 30 Harv. Law Rev. 491. Since the decision in Hammer
v. Dagenhart, supra, the opinion of the majority has been criticized in
the following articles: Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case, (1918) 32Harv. Law Rev. 45; Jones, The Child Labor Decision. (1918) 6 Cal. LawRev. 395; Parkinson, The Federal Child Labor Decision, (1918) TheChild Labor Bul., (1918) VII, p. 89; Powell, The Child Labor Decision,(1918) The Nation. vol. 107, p. 730; The Child Labor Law, the TenthAmendment and the Commerce Clause, (1918) 3 So. Law Quar. 175;
see also note. (1918) 27 Yale Law Jour. 1092. ahd (1918) 17 Mich. Law
Rev. 83.
53 Note 15, supra.
54 Powell, op. cit., So. Law Quar.
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means the prohibition of something, and when interstate com-
merce is the matter to be regulated I cannot doubt that the regu-
lation may prohibit any part of such commerce that Congress
sees fit to forbid.
55
In the second place, there is evidence to indicate that the
framers of the constitution intended the power given to Congress
to regulate interstate commerce to include the power to prohibit
such commerce in certain cases. This is shown, first, by the
fact that they -intended to give Congress all the power over inter-
state commerce that the states had previously had and this in-
cluded the power to prohibit such commerce.56 It is shown, sec-
ondly, that they specifically denied to Congress the right to pass
any law prior to 1808 which should prohibit the "migration or im-
portation" of slaves 5 7 a denial of power entirely superfluous un-
less the power to prohibit such commerce existed, in the absence
of such denial.
In the third place, the power to regulate foreign commerce
has always been held to include the power to place prohibitions
upon such commerce, 58 and the commerce clause gives to Congress
the same power over interstate as over foreign commerce. The
friends of the Child La:bor Law do not infer from this that Con-
gress could necessarily impose the same restrictions upon inter-
state commerce as upon foreign commerce; but they assert that
whatever difference there may be exists not because the power
exercised is the power to regulate in the one case but not in the
other, but because the limitations of due process of law affect
the power .to regulate in different ways. In other words, although
the constitutional restrictions on that power may vary with the
kind of commerce, the power to "regulate" remains the same.
And since the power to regulate foreign commerce includes the
power to prohibit it, it must of necessity follow that the power to
regulate interstate commerce also includes the power to impose
prohibitions upon it.
Finally, it is only necessary to refer to the Lottery Act, the
White Slave Act, and the Pure Food Act to show that there have
.n. Hammer v. Dagenhart. note 9, supra.
. This argument is carefully developed by Mr. Parkinson, op. cit.,
Col. Law Rev. 370 et seq.
5 The Constitution of the United States. Art. L Sec. 9.
58 For citation of cases in support of this view see Parkinson. op. cit.,
The Child Labor Bul. 225-228; also note by E. B. Whitney. (1898) 7
Yale Law Jour. 291.
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been other cases in which the Supreme Court has viewed with
approval the exercise by Congress of the power to prohibit en-
tirelv interstate commerce in certain commodities.
(b) The Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce May Be
Used for the Protection of Public Health, Morals, Safety, rid
Welfare in General: This point might perhaps be stated in this
way: a regulation of commerce does not cease to be such merely
because its purpose and effect are to eradicate evils over which
Congress has no direct control. It is not the business of the
Supreme Court to pry into the motives which prompt Congress to
exercise its power to regulate commerce. *Whatever restrictions
there may be upon the power by reason of alleged violations of
due process of law, the power to regulate commerce may properly
be used by Congress to remedy any evils which may exist before,
during, or after interstate commerce takes place, without making
such action any less truly an exercise of the power to regulate
such commerce. It is apparent that this view is in conflict with
the position of the opponents of the Child Labor Law who argue
that, while Congress may exercise a real police power under the
commerce clause, that police power is limited to the actual do-
main of interstate commerce and may only extend to the prohibi-
tion of evils existing in or directly promoted by such commerce.
The friends of the law, in short, look upon interstate commerce
as a means entrusted to Congress to be used in any manner which
will promote the public health, morals, and safety; and they find
in the Lottery Act, the White Slave Act, and laws of similar char-
acter instances in which Congress has used the commerce power,
not to protect any particular group of people, not to strike at
evils which are limited to any particular locality, but to protect
the nation at large from injury or danger. The evils, in other
words, do not need to have any particular locus to be within the
reach of congressional police power under the commerce clause.
(c) No Distinctions Exist Between This Law and the Other
Police Regulations Based on the Commerce Clause That Would
Make It Less a Regulation of Commerce Than They: Those who
believe the Child Labor Law to be constitutional feel that the
efforts to distinguish it from the Lottery Act and so forth and to
prove that, while those earlier acts were bona fide regulations of
commerce, the Child Labor Law is not, are after all merely ef-
forts to set up straw men for the purpose of knocking them down.
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They take the position, first, that the alleged distinctions do not in
fact exist; and, second, that if they did exist they would not
prove the Child Labor Law to be any less a regulation of com-
merce than the earlier statutes mentioned.
In support of the first point it is contended that the Child
Labor Law does not stand alone in excluding from interstate
commerce articles in themselves harmless. Lottery tickets are
no more harmful in themselves than milk tickets; the goods ex-
cluded by the Commodities Clause"s are in all respects above re-
proach; the anti-trust statutes forbid the shipment of goods in-
trinsically indistinguishable from any other articles of commerce.
Nor is it true that the Child Labor Law is unique in that it
excludes goods when no danger or injury can result from their
interstate transportation. The other police regulations passed by
Congress under the commerce clause have rested usually on the
ground that the forbidden shipments were "acts of evil tendency."
So also is the shipment of goods manufactured in a child labor
factory an act of evil tendency. It promotes child labor both be-
fore and after the actual shipment takes place: before, because a
producer could not afford to continue the employment of children
if it cut him off from interstate markets; after, because states
which may honestly desire to abolish child labor feel a reluctance
to place their own industries at the mercy of the competition which
results from the shipping in from other states of goods made by
children. It is a peculiarly naive logic which insists that a cause
must always chronologically precede an effect, and that interstate
commerce cannot cause or promote child labor because the im-
mediate child labor is over before the immediate goods are de-
livered to the interstate carrier. The manufacture of goods is a
continuous process, and its effects control its beginnings quite
as much as with lottery tickets. This point has been clearly put
in language which is worthy of quotation: "Clearly enough the
transportation is a contributing factor to the employment of chil-
dren, as it is to the consumption of liquor and the purchase of
lottery tickets. In terms of physics, the transportation is a pull
in the one case, and a push in the others. The matter belongs,
however, to the realm, not of physics, but of economics. And
in economics the push and the pull are not to be differentiated.
In so far, then, as the majority [of the Supreme Court] imply
59 See note 71, (1919) 3 U'fINNEsoTA LAW REVIEw 311.
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that the interstate transportation was not necessary to the harmful
results aimed at by the Child Labor Law, they are obviously in
error. Unless it were necessary, the law would have been idle
and useless, no employer or 'next friend' of children would have
objected to it, and it would not have touched, even obliquely,
matters reserved to the states."60 In other words, just as the
Mann Act forbids the use of interstate commerce as a facility
in carrying on the white slave traffic, so the Child Labor Law
prohibits such commerce from being used to promote the evil
of child labor, and there is, accordingly, no difference in prin-
ciple between the two as to their being each a bona fide regu-
lation of interstate commerce.
But in the second place, even if it be admitted that there are
important distinctions between the Child Labor Law and the
other regulations enacted under the commerce clause, those dif-
ferences do not have any bearing whatever upon the question
whether the Child Labor Law is or is not a regulation of com-
merce. The distinction, for example, that the Child Labor Law
benefits the producer, while the Lottery Act and similar statutes
protect the consumer, is an entirely artificial and worthless dis-
tinction. The enemies of the law are challenged to show any-
thing in the commerce clause itself, the acts of Congress passed
in pursuance thereof, and the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, which in any way suggest that a prohibition of
interstate commerce loses its character as a regulation of that
commerce in the constitutional sense because it is the consumer
of goods shipped, rather than the producer, who receives the
benefit therefrom. To hold otherwise is to inject into the con-
stitution something which the framers did not put there. "Pro-
ponents [of this distinction] are standing on their political ideas
of what ought to be in the Constitution rather than on what the
Supreme Court has said is there."61 In like manner, even if it
is admitted for the sake of argument that the Child Labor Law
excludes harmless commodities from interstate commerce, or
even admitting that the exclusion established is arbitrary and
unreasonable, this would not prove that the law is not a regula-
tion of commerce. It would merely prove that Congress had
regulated commerce in such a way as to deprive persons of
60 Powell, op. cit., So. Law Quar. 197.
61 Parkinson, op. cit., 31 Pol. Sci. Quar. 537.
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liberty or property without due process of law. In the Lottery
Case and in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.62
the Supreme Court plainly intimated that power to exclude
commodities from interstate commerce might be held to be limited
so as to preclude its exercise in a manner palpably arbitrary,
but in each of thee cases the implication is very plain that any
such limitation would arise from the due process of law clause
and not at all from any implied narrowing of the meaning of
the word "regu4ate" as used in the commerce clause. What the
critics of the law have done in using the distinctions mentioned
to prove that the Child Labor Law is not a regulation of com-
merce is to employ an argument "built upon a due process dis-
tinction and then unwarrantably transferred to the commerce
clause.
'613
2. The Child Labor Law Does Not Work a Denial of Duc
Process of Law. When Senator Beveridge was defending the
constitutionality of his child labor bill in 1906 he took the posi-
tion that the power of Congress over interstate commerce was
absolute, and that while Congress would naturally be restrained
by considerations of policy and expediency from any arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of that power, the power itself was
subject to no constitutional restrictions of any kind. 6 4  This
means, of course, that Congress in the exercise of its commerce
power is not restricted by any limitations arising from the due
process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A writer on the subject who regards the law as unconstitu-
tional upon other grounds takes the position that there is no
property right to ship products in interstate commerce. That
even if there were such a right it would be a "right to engage
in interstate commerce lawfully regulated. So, if the regulation
be lawful, the property right has existed subject to the regu-
lation. And to assail the validity of the regulation by the due
process clause is to argue in a circle."6 5
62 (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 61 L. Ed. 326, 37 S. C. R. 180.
63 Powell, op. cit., 3 So. Law Quar. 194.
64 In the course of the debate the senator said: "Will you ask me
whether or not I think we have power to prohibit the transportation
in interstate commerce of the milk of a cow milked by a young lady
eighteen years old? Undoubtedly we have the power, but undoubtedly
we would not do it. We have the power to prohibit the transportation
through interstate commerce of any article." Cong. Rec., vol. 41, p. 1826.
65 Hull, op. cit., 31 Pol. Sci. Quar. 529.
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With these two exceptions, there would seem to be no dis-
agreement among friends and critics of the Child Labor Law
that the validity of any congressional prohibitions of interstate
commerce must be subject to due process of law; and this view
is supported by decisions of the Supreme Court.66 The pro-
ponents of the law, however, deny that it deprives any person of
property or liberty without due process of law and they advance
the following arguments in support of their view.
At the outset attention is called to the fact that "the due
process does not protect things, but persons. Goods made by
child labor have no constitutional immunities." 67 Therefore the
law does not fail of due process merely because the goods shipped
are harmless.
Compliance with the test of due process does not depend,
therefore, upon the character of the goods excluded but upon
the effect of that exclusion upon the rights and immunities of
those who are forbidden to ship the goods. Now a constitutional
right to ship in interstate commerce the products of factories
employing children must of necessity rest upon a constitutional
right to employ children; just as the constitutional right to ship
lottery tickets in interstate commerce depends upon the exist-
ence of a constitutional right to conduct or engage in a lottery
enterprise. The question then reduces itself to this: is there a
right to employ children, of such a nature that an interference
with it constitutes a denial of due proces of law? Now the tests
of due process of law are not very definite, and the cases in
which acts of Congress have been invalidated for violation of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment are relatively rare and
throw little or no light on this particular problem. However, it
has been held that the requirement of due process of law im-
posed on the federal government by the Fifth Amendment is
the same in principle as the requirement of due process of law
imposed upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.68 And
since it has long been established not only by the state courts6 9
66 As, for instance, in Adair v. United States, note 26, supra. See
also 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 299.
67 Powell, op. cit., 3 So. Law Quar. 194.
68 Parkinson, op. cit., The Child Labor Bul. v. IV, pt. 2, p. 245, citing
Slaughter House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 26, 19 L. Ed. 915; Tona-
wanda v. Lyon, (1901) 181 U. S. 389, 45 L. Ed. 908, 21 S. C. R. 609;
Twining v. New Jersey, (1908) 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. Ed. 97, 29 S. C. R. 14.
69 See 16 R. C. L. 477 and cases cited.
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but also by 'the Supreme Court7 0 that a state may forbid or
regulate the employment of children without depriving anyone
of liberty or property without due process of law, it must follow
that Congress does not violate due process by interfering in a
similar or analogous manner with the employment of children.
It does not, however, follow from this argument that Congress
can deny the privileges of interstate commerce to one who pur-
sues any line of conduct that the state can interfere with without
a violation on its part of due process of law. "So Congress
could not prescribe that a man should not ship goods across a
state line in case he violated his marriage vows. There would
be no nexus between the infidelity and the transportation. But
there is a nexus between making goods and shipping them. Evil
in the making grows by the transportation it feeds on. Trans-
portation increases child labor. It aids an evil which is a menace
to the attainment of national objects. Congress cannot obliter-
ate the evil. But it should be allowed to lessen it by denying it
aid from the enjoyment of the highways under national control.
If it ever should go further and seek -to apily its commerce
power to evils in no way dependent upon the commerce subject
to its control, then the Supreme Court may with wisdom declare
that it has failed to make a legitimate connection between its
prohibition of transportation and the circumstances on which
the prohibition is conditioned. But the court did not need to
annul the Child Labor Law in order be free to deal with such
cases if ever they should arise."
'7 1
3. It Does Not Violate the Tenth Amendment. Those who
defend the Child Labor Law regard the contention that the law
violates the Tenth Amendment with less respect than any of the
other arguments directed against its constitutionality. They
point out three weaknesses in it which convince them of its lack
of merit. In the first place, the Child Labor Law takes away
from the states no right reserved to them by the constitution.
The law forbids the shipment of certain commodities across state
lines; it does not forbid the employment of children. No state
at any time during its history has ever had the power to compel
any other state to admit its products; and during the Confed-
eration the states freely exercised the power to set up embargoes
70 Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, (1913) 231 U. S. 320, 58
L. Ed. 245, 34 S. C. R. 60.
71 Powell, op. cit., 3 So. Law Quar. 201.
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and restrictions on goods from neighboring states. Therefore
when the Child Labor Law takes from the individual states the
right to impose the products of their industry upon other states
through the channels of interstate commerce it takes away no
right which the states ever had and therefore no right which
could have been reserved to them by the federal constitution.
In the second place, it is held that it is unsound to declare the
law void as an invasion of the reserved powers of the states
because of its indirect or incidental effects. Never before has
the exercise by Congress of an admitted power been held un-
constitutional because of such incidental effects upon the authority
of the states. Although there have been plenty of instances in
which congressional authority over interstate commerce has been
so exercised as to impair seriously the freedom of action of the
states in matters within their jurisdiction, these have always been
regarded as the inevitable results of our federal form of govern-
ment.7 2  Thus the Lottery Act, the Pure Food Act, the Meat
Inspection Act, all in precisely the same way discourage the
production of the commodities excluded from interstate com-
merce. To invalidate one law because of its indirect invasion
of the power of the states and not to treat in the same way other
acts which also invade that power leaves upon the shoulders of
the court the burden of determining when the indirect effects of
a law are a sufficiently serious interference with state authority
to warrant the interposition of the judicial ban; and we have
thus opened up another fertile field for the production of judge-
made law.
Finally, the argument based on the Tenth Amendment is
superfluous. "If the Child Labor Law was a proper exercise of
power to regulate interstate commerce, it was by the explicit
terms of the Tenth Amendment not an exercise of a power re-
served to the states. If it was not a proper exercise of the power
to regulate interstate commerce, it was unconstitutional, and
nothing more need be said about it.
' '
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72An extreme example of this is the "Shreveport Case," Houston,
etc., Ry. Co. v. United States, (1914) 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 34
S. C. R. 833, in which railroads were compelled to raise their intrastate
freight rates which had been fixed by a state railroad commission, because
those rates produced discrimination against competing shipments in in-
terstate commerce which were being made at rates held reasonable by
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
7 Powell, op. cit., So. Law Quar.
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4. The Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes.74 The dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes is not an attempt to build
up a constructive argument in support of the Child Labor Law,
but is rather a pungent criticism of the reasoning of the majority.
Since the majority opinion did not take up at all the due process
of law argument, the justice confined the batteries of his criti-
cism in general to a single concise attack upon the remaining two
points of difference.
He protests most vigorously against invalidating an exercise
by Congress of one of its admitted powers because of the col-
lateral effect of such regulation upon matters reserved to state
control. "I should have thought," declared the justice, "that
the most conspicuous decisions of this court had made it clear
that the power to regulate commerce and other constitutional
powers could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it
might interfere with the carrying out of the domestic policy of
any state." He then proceeds to comment on some of these
"conspicuous decisions" in which the indirect effect upon state
authority of congressional acts has been held quite irrelevant
to the question of their validity. Furthermore, some of the acts
already sustained have excluded from commerce commodities
intrinsically harmless, and the Supreme Court in the Hoke case75
has specifically put itself on record as upholding the use of the
commerce power for police purposes. In these cases "it does
not matter whether the supposed evil precedes or follows the
transportation. It is enough that in the opinion of Congress the
transportation encourages the evil."1
7 6
It is no longer open to dispute that the power to regulate
commerce includes the power to prohibit it in some cages. Mr.
Justice Holmes denies strenuously the propriety of upholding or
invalidating the exercise of this power to prohibit commerce in
accordance with judicial views of the morality or immorality of
the transactions prohibited. But if this were permissible, there
is no denying that child labor is an evil which ought to be dealt
with as readily as any other. "I should have thought that if we
were to introduce our own moral conceptions where in my
opinion they do not belong, this was pre-eminently a case for
upholding the exercise of all its powers by the United States."
7 Justices Brandeis, McKenna, and Clark concurred in the dissent.
7 Note 31, supra.
76 Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting opinion, 247 U. S. at p. 279.
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And finally, the law does not interfere with any power re-
served to the states. "They may regulate their internal affairs
and their domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek
to send their products across the state line they are no longer
within their rights. . . The public policy of the United
States is shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a
whole.... The national welfare as understood by Con-
gress may require a different attitude within its sphere from that
of some self-seeking state. It seems to me entirely constitutional
for Congress to enforce its understanding by all the means at its
command."
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing analysis of the arguments for and against the
constitutionality of the Child Labor Law, the effort has been to
make clear the exact issues involved in that controversy. It
should also make clear that the advocates and opponents of the
law disagreed not only upon the question of its validity but also
upon the question of just what -the actual result would be of a
decision sustaining the law. Clearly it would advance the na-
tional police power far beyond its old limits. To what extent
would it be expanded? Would there be any real limits upon
that expansion?
The opponents of the law have felt that to uphold its consti-
tutionality would be to open wide the door to congressional inter-
ference in any and every matter now confided to state control.
In fact, they have pretty unanimously been seized with an irre-
sistible impulse to lapse into reductio ad absurdum and paint in
the most lurid colors the constitutional havoc wrought upon
state authority and state institutions by such a doctrine. They
argue that, if a man can be denied the privileges of interstate
commerce because he employs children, he can be denied those
privileges because of any other line of conduct which a majority
in Congress view with disapproval; the line which now exists
between the police power of the state and the regulatory power
of Congress would be obliterated, and the only difference between
the authority of the two governments to regulate the conduct of
its citizens would be that one could act directly and the other by
a process of indirection.
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It seems clear that some at least who have taken this extreme
view of the results of the Child Labor Law in expanding the
scope of the national police power have lost sight of the fact that
any exercise of that power must be kept within due process of
law. But, even if this were not the case, it should be borne in
mind that a court which has expressed its contempt for those
who show a tendency to push the application of constitutional
principles to a "drily logical extreme" is not apt to permit itself
to be browbeaten by the requirements of absolute consistency into
upholding any law which is a manifestly ridiculous or dangerous
application of even the most harmless principle.
But if the Supreme Court had been willing to sustain the
Child Labor Law on the basis of the argument advanced by its
friends in its behalf, it is apparent that, while the national
police power would have been strikingly enlarged, that expansion
would not have been unlimited but would have been confined to
well defined boundaries. Under this interpretation, the power
of Congress to exclude commodities from the channels of inter-
state commerce could be used, not to strike at any evil which
Congress might succeed by this method in bringing within its
reach, but to strike at only those evils which could be said to be
promoted by interstate commerce or motivated by the expecta-
tion or necessity of enjoying the privileges of such commerce.
Concretely, those evils would be those connected with the proc-
esses of manufacturing the products destined for interstate
markets. Congress would doubtless have gained the authority
to regulate the conditions of labor in any industry dependent on
interstate commerce for its markets, and this. of course includes
every industry of importance in the country; it is not clear that
it would have gained much more.
But if the scope of the national police power under the com-
merce clause was not enlarged by the decision invalidating the
Child Labor Law, neither was it narrowed. Congress still re-
tains full authority to deal with any evil which threatens to
injure, destroy, or obstruct interstate commerce. There still
remains the authority to protect the national health, morals.
safety, and general welfare from such evils as depend upon the
physical agency of interstate commerce facilities for the trans-
portation of commodities or persons. But evils which feed on
interstate commerce only in the sense that they would dwindle
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away if the right of those responsible for them to engage in
interstate commerce were withdrawn are still beyond the reach of
congressional power as conferred by the commerce clause. Con-
gress may exercise a police power to protect interstate commerce,
and to protect the nation from the actual misuse of that com-
merce; it may not, however, protect the nation from all the other
equally dangerous and much more numerous evils which would
die of discouragement if the interstate commerce they thrive on
were prohibited.
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